

An Uneasy Nexus: Development, Security and the EU's African Peace Facility

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Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union has promoted, more explicitly than in earlier decades, the view that security and development policies are inextricably linked. Yet, trying to dismantle the walls erected around the two policy domains has proved very difficult. The launch and implementation of the African Peace Facility (APF), meant to support the African Union in the promotion of security in Africa, exemplifies some of these tensions. While existing analyses have emphasized the role of interests – in a sort of accidental convergence of the bureaucratic interest of the European Commission and those of the Member States – this article concentrates on the normative aspects of the initiative. In particular, the three principles underpinning it – promotion of ownership, solidarity, and a virtuous development-security nexus – make the APF different from any other EU security initiative. Whilst boosting the AU's clout in the field of peace and security and as an actor in the international arena, the implementation of the APF has nonetheless presented some problems. First, a larger number of resources have been devoted to the peace missions than to capacity building. Second, its alleged success has diverted attention from other important areas in EU-Africa relations. Finally, the EU's rhetoric on the Africanization of security, paradoxically, has risked undermining the legitimacy of the African Union in Africa.

1 INTRODUCTION

The launch of the African Peace Facility (APF) at the end of 2003 – through which the European Union (EU) has provided support to the African Union (AU) for the promotion of peace and security in Africa – was accompanied by a number of controversies. Its supporters, for instance the AU Commission and the European Commission, saw it as a necessary addition to enhance the impact of the EU's development policy, in compliance with the principle of ownership. Its opponents, including several EU Member States and the majority of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), claimed that, since it was funded with resources traditionally destined to poverty eradication, the APF epitomized the securitization

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of EU development policy. This contentious debate within policy circles has found little reflection in academic literature, and this oversight is particularly surprising given that the APF has become one of the key funding instruments of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Scholarly attention, conversely, has concentrated on the various military and civilian missions conducted directly by the European Union in several African countries. From the brief analyses devoted to the APF, it can be drawn that interests, albeit of a different nature, have prevailed over norms: the establishment of the APF was possible only because of an accidental convergence of the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission and those of the various EU Member States.¹

This article seeks to address this gap and thus, by unravelling the rationale behind the launch and the consequences of the implementation of the APF, pays particular attention to the more normative aspects of the initiative. To do so, it draws on a wide range of sources: a meticulous analysis of primary documents (including the summaries of the meetings of the Joint Coordination Committee of the APF), official evaluations, specialized news reports, and a dozen interviews conducted between January and March 2013 with senior officials from the EU – working for the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) – and from Africa – working for the AU Commission and the Secretariat of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group. Following this introduction, section 2 of the article outlines the construction of the EU's discourse on the development–security nexus and the EU's evolving role as a provider of security in Africa. Section 3 traces the evolution of the APF since its conception in Maputo in July 2003, including its integration into the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Partnership (JAES); it also discusses the three main principles that underpin it (development–security nexus, partnership and solidarity) and its two key components (support for peace operations and capacity building). The last section reviews the main argument. More specifically, it concludes that, from its initial connotation as a conflict management tool, the APF has gradually turned into, albeit slowly and somewhat problematically, an important component of the EU's comprehensive approach to security (and development), owing to its increased emphasis on both pre- and post-conflict interventions and on capacity building. Yet, its alleged success has diverted attention from other important areas in

¹ R. Keane, *The EU's African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better late than never?* 24 *European Sec. Rev.* 9–11 (2004); D. Sicurelli, *Framing security and development in the EU pillar structure. How the views of the European Commission affect EU Africa policy*, 30 *J. European Integration* 2, 217–34 (2008); G.R. Olsen, *The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?* 16 *Int'l Peacekeeping* 2, 245–60 (2009); N. Bagoyoko & M. Gibert, *The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development: the European Union in Africa*, 45 *J. Dev. Stud.* 5, 789–814 (2009).

EU-Africa relations and has even risked undermining the legitimacy of the African Union.

2 MAKING SENSE OF THE EU'S DISCOURSE ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union has projected, more explicitly than in earlier decades, the view that development and security should be closely linked. This approach has been encapsulated in key policy documents (such as the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2005 European Consensus on Development, and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy), funding mechanisms (more specifically the Instrument for Stability and the APF), and important international agreements (most notably the 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement). The link between development and security policies has generated significant interest among scholars of EU external relations. Some have cautioned against the negative implications of subordinating development to security policy, particularly in terms of poverty reduction,² whereas others have claimed that development policy should legitimately be part of the EU's comprehensive approach to security and contribute to the crafting of a grand strategy, with the view to enhancing the EU's impact in the international arena.³ This section spells out these debates, before turning its attention to the EU's policy towards Africa, where the link between development and security policies is subject to continuous scrutiny.

2.1 THE EU AND THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

It is difficult to question the fact that development and security have always been interwoven. This nexus, however, has become more prominent since the end of the Cold War, with an increasing amount of energy being devoted to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-war reconstruction and security-sector reforms.

² See e.g., J. Faust & D. Messner, *Europe's New Security Strategy: Challenges for Development Policy*, 17 *European J. Dev. Research* 3, 423–36 (2005); A. Hadfield, *Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, 12 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 1, 39–66 (2007); R. Youngs, *Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude*, 30 *J. European Integration* 3, 419–37 (2008); K. Del Biondo, S. Oltsch & J. Orbie, *Security and Development in EU External Relations: Converging, but in which direction?* in *The Routledge Handbook of European Security Policy* 126–41 (S. Biscop & R. G. Whitman eds., Routledge 2012).

³ See for example, C. Gebhard & P.M. Norheim-Martinsen, *Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity*, 20 *European Sec. J.* 2, 221–41 (2011); K. Zwolski, *The EU and a Holistic Security Approach after Lisbon: Competing Norms and the Power of the Dominant Discourse*, 19 *J. European Pub. Policy* 7, 988–1005 (2012); J. Howorth, *The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?* 48 *JCMS* 3, 455–74 (2010); M.E. Smith, *A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose, and the EU's Changing Global Role*, 18 *J. European Pub. Policy* 2, 144–63 (2011).

The tragic events of September 2011 have further strengthened the nexus, with the fight against terrorism becoming a priority for many countries. Clearly, 'alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relations', in that both fields have significantly expanded their remit: in this sense, the nexus 'can perhaps be best illustrated as the merging of human development and human security – as intricate and complex ambitions in idealist and normative combinations'.⁴ Yet, this is a matter for concern not only for theorists, but also, and perhaps more significantly, for policy-makers. For instance, some donors have re-directed aid, which has increasingly been seen as a key tool in the fight against international terrorism. Others have attempted, but only partially succeeded, to broaden the definition of foreign aid within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) with the aim of extending the eligibility of additional categories of security-related spending as development assistance (ODA) – as foreign aid is known more formally.⁵ Yet others have attempted to legitimize security activities and initiatives by instrumentally referring to the promotion of development. These debates are of great interest for the European Union, where actors in the two policy domains tend to place different emphasis on the two components of the development-security nexus.

From a security policy perspective, the general view has been that 'security is a precondition for development'. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) set the parameters, providing a comprehensive understanding of the concept of security and identifying a range of new challenges and threats, including poverty and degradation. Moreover, it expressed reservations that military interventions could be sufficient to address all the various challenges, and therefore suggested that effective security demands holistic solutions, combining structural measures with operational instruments, including development policy, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy.⁶ The use of a mono-causal link between security and development was criticized by development practitioners, who feared that resources would be reallocated from poverty eradication and developing regions to security instruments and regions more strategically relevant to Europe. These concerns about a securitization of development intensified with the 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in that a new set of security objectives – e.g., combating terrorism, countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), strengthening cooperation to prevent mercenary activities, and encouraging parties

⁴ M. Stern & J. Öjendal, *Mapping the Security-Development Nexus*, 4 Sec. Dialogue 1, 5–29 (2010). See also M. Duffield, *Global Governance and New Wars* (Zed Books 2001); D. Chandler, *The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise 'Anti-Foreign Policy'*, 10 J. Int'l Rel. & Dev. 362–86 (2007).

⁵ N. Woods, *The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid*, 81 Int'l Affairs 2, 393–409 (2005); M. Brozka, *Extending ODA or Creating a New Reporting Instrument for Security-related Expenditures for Development?*, 26 Dev. Policy Rev. 2, 131–50 (2008).

⁶ European Council, *The European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world* (12 Dec. 2003).

to ratify and implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – seemed at odds with the traditional development focus of the EU-ACP partnership agreement.⁷ The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS provided a more balanced view, by stating that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’.⁸ The adoption in 2011 of the cooperation frameworks with the Sahel and the Horn bear testimony to the new EU assertiveness in advocating a comprehensive approach in its relations with two strategic regions of sub-Saharan Africa.⁹

From a development policy perspective, the view has been to treat security and development policies as complementary. The 2005 European Consensus on Development provided a platform for setting out common objectives, values and principles for both the European Commission and the Member States. In a further attempt to project an image of a ‘force for good’, the EU conceived ownership to be one of the guiding principles in its relations with the developing world, and rectified the ‘security first’ approach of the ESS, establishing that ‘without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur’. Moreover, it reaffirmed the commitment to delivering ‘more and better aid’ and to promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).¹⁰ In fact, one of the twelve commitments made by the EU in the context of its ambitious initiative on PCD was on peace and security, but its implementation, as the European Commission itself admits, has been well below expectations.¹¹ Interestingly, it should be noted that from the development policy point of view, the securitization of development policy may have resulted in higher levels of foreign aid being allocated to developing countries and may have contributed to placing development issues higher on the EU’s policy and political agenda. Nevertheless, even when the securitization of development is not fully-fledged and purposeful, but is the

⁷ Some, for example Hadfield, argue that with these changes, ‘security appeared to define development’, while others, for instance Mackie, have noted that most of the new provisions were broadly in line with the concerns raised by the ACP group itself, which had no problems in accepting them – also because additional resources were pledged. See Hadfield, *supra* n. 2; J. Mackie, *Continuity and change in international cooperation: The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its first revision*, 9 *Perspective European Politics & Socy.* 2, 143–56 (2008).

⁸ European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, 8 (Brussels, 11 Dec. 2008).

⁹ M. Furness & S. Gänzle, *The European Union’s Development Policy: a Balancing Act between a ‘More Comprehensive Approach’ and Creeping Securitisation*, University of Agder ISL Working Paper 11 (2012).

¹⁰ Council of the European Union (2006a), *Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: “The European Consensus”*, OJ C 46/1, (24 Feb. 2006).

¹¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s initiatives on PCD, see M. Carbone, *Policy coherence and EU development policy* (Routledge 2009).

consequence of an overall effort towards a more coherent external action, its negative impact on poverty eradication cannot be discounted.¹²

From this short analysis, it emerges that the EU has not spelt out a vision for the balance and direction of causality between these two policies – and this affects implementation on the ground. In fact, while it is generally accepted that the EU is good at setting normative frameworks, its implementation record is not of the same calibre. Some years ago, Youngs, on the basis of empirical evidence from several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, claimed that development-related decisions in the security field received little input from development circles, whereas development policy was more security-aware.¹³ A few years later, Keukeleire and Raube reached the same conclusion: for policy-makers, the security-development nexus has been conceived as a theoretical exercise and therefore it has proved difficult to make sense of it in every-day policy making.¹⁴ This lack of clarity negatively affects the coherence and credibility of the European Union not only in relation to the developing world but also in the international arena – and this problem was one of the main rationales behind the Treaty of Lisbon. By disabling the pillar structure, strengthening the post of the High Representative, and creating the European External Action Service (EEAS), the aim of the Treaty of Lisbon was to enable easier interaction among different policy domains. Its initial implementation, however, suggests that the walls built around the various domains have not been dismantled and that the confrontation of different organization cultures within the European Commission and the Council may generate new costs and inefficiencies: with the creation of the EEAS, bureaucratic clashes have not been eliminated but instead have even intensified.¹⁵

2.2 INTERESTS, NORMS AND THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY IN AFRICA

The EU Strategy for Africa, adopted in December 2005, can be seen as an example of the convergence of the two perspectives of the security-development nexus. On the one hand, the European Commission, and more specifically its Directorate General for Development, identified foreign aid and policy coherence for development as the key tools for reaching economic and social development in Africa. On the other hand, the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana saw the promotion of peace and security in Africa as central to the EU's external

¹² Del Biondo, Oltsch & Orbie, *supra* n. 2; Furness & Gänzle, *supra* n. 9.

¹³ Youngs, *supra* n. 2.

¹⁴ S. Keukeleire & K. Raube, *The security-development nexus and securitisation in the EU's policies towards developing countries*, 26 Cambridge Rev. Int'l Affairs 3 (2013).

¹⁵ M.E. Smith, *The European External Action Service and the Security-Development Nexus: Organizing for Effectiveness Or Incoherence?* J. European Pub. Policy (forthcoming); H. Merket, *The EU and the Security-Development Nexus: Bridging the Legal Divide*, In this issue.

affairs agenda. Since the final document was adopted with little consultation by the relevant stakeholders a more participatory process for an upgraded and shared strategy commenced. The ensuing Joint Africa-EU Strategy projected the idea of a strategic partnership in which two equal partners would collaborate on the basis of common values for the pursuit of common interests and objectives. To meet these objectives, a first plan of action for 2008–2010, followed by a second one for 2011–2013, were adopted, including eight Africa-EU Partnerships. One of these dealt with peace and security, whose central aim was to facilitate the full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.¹⁶

The EU's Africa policy, and more specifically its attempt to promote security, has generated diverse types of explanations. A widely held view is that the EU is nothing other than a realist power which seeks not only to guarantee itself access to the continent's emerging markets, but also to preserve its security interests.¹⁷ For this reason, it has attempted to address 'hard' security issues, most notably conflicts and international terrorism, as well as 'soft' security issues, such as preventing migration and human and drug trafficking. Moreover, it has sought to promote a different type of interest, that of establishing itself as a global power. In the late 1990s, not only was it clear that the traditional tools had become inadequate, but the EU saw its involvement in conflict prevention and management in Africa as vital in becoming a more significant player in international politics.¹⁸ This, however, did not necessarily mean that the profile of Africa in the EU's external agenda was augmented; for instance, the injection of securitized principles, for Hadfield, has transformed EU development policy from a mainstay of EU external relations into a low-profile aspect of EU external relations.¹⁹ Another strand of the literature has investigated the role of the EU as a normative power. The EU has attempted, not always successfully, to promote norms and at times also to empower African countries.²⁰ By doing so, its perception by African policy-makers has gradually improved. Because of its

¹⁶ Council of European Union, *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, 15961/05, Presse 367, (19 Dec. 2005); Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, 16344/07, Presse 291, (9 Dec. 2007). For comprehensive analyses of EU-Africa relations, see D. Sicurelli, *The European Union's African Policies: Norms, Interests and Impact* (Ashgate, 2010); *The EU and Africa: From Europeafrique to Afro-Europa* (A. Adebajo & K. Whiteman eds., Hurst & Company, 2012); *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* (J. Mangala ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2013); *The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?* (M. Carbone ed., Manchester U. Press 2013).

¹⁷ M. Farrell, *A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa*, 27 J. European Integration 23, 26–83 (2005); C. Gegout, *EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International Actor*, 8 Ethnopolitics 3–4, 403–15 (2009).

¹⁸ Olsen, *supra* n. 1; Bagayoko & Gibert, *supra* n. 1.

¹⁹ Hadfield, *supra* n. 2.

²⁰ S. Scheipers & D. Sicurelli, *Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations*, 15 J. European Pub. Policy 4, 607–23 (2008).

reluctance (as well as its limited capacity) to intervene in most African conflicts during the 1990s – and when it did, it was the result of an initiative of one of its most powerful Member States – the EU for a long time was not perceived as a credible actor, or even an actor, in African security. Since the mid-2000s, it has started to be seen as very cooperative, and this shift is linked to its support to the APSA, rather than its direct military and civilian interventions.²¹

The second type of debate relates to the balance of power between the EU Member States and the European Commission. The prevailing view is that the EU's (increasing) role in African security is the result of the (convergence of) preferences of key Member States, most notably the former colonial powers. France, in particular, has shifted from being a major obstacle into being one of the most strenuous supporters of further EU involvement in Africa – in most cases pushing for military missions closer to its own interests. The UK has also been in favour of dealing with African security problems, but within a more comprehensive approach aimed at also making progress on poverty eradication. Conversely, a large number of EU Member States do not have a particular stake in African security. For instance, Germany has consistently been reluctant – and recently it has been backed up by the post-2004 Member States in Central and Eastern Europe – to any direct intervention in African conflicts.²² This intergovernmentalist approach has been challenged by scholars who take institutionalist and inter-organisationalist approaches. In this sense, some argue that, by acting as a policy entrepreneur and framing the promotion of security as necessary for development, not only has the European Commission pushed the Council to make decisions to manage African conflicts in ways that are favourable to its interest but has even replaced it in the management of resources.²³ Others have maintained that the EU's engagement in African security, besides being driven by institutional dynamics or the interests of the Member States, 'is equally shaped by an emerging regional security involving the AU and the UN, which shows patterns of functional convergence'.²⁴ This means that any explanation of EU's Africa (security) policy must take into account the evolution of the African

²¹ Gegout, *supra* n. 17; D. Sicurelli, *Regional partners? Perceptions and criticisms at the African Union*, in *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor* 180–94 (S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti eds., Routledge 2010).

²² Bagoyoko & Gibert, *supra* n. 1. See also *From Rivalry to Partnership? New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa* (T. Chafer & G. Cumming eds., Ashgate 2011).

²³ A. Krause, *The European Union's Africa policy: the Commission as a policy entrepreneur in the CFSP*, 8 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 2, 221–37 (2003); Sicurelli, *supra* n. 1; Bagoyoko and Gibert point to the role of the Directorate General for Development in launching a new security agenda for Africa as a way to regain legitimacy, considering the failure of its aid programme in promoting economic and social development. Bagoyoko & Gibert, *supra* n. 1.

²⁴ M. Brosig, *The Emerging Peace and Security regime in Africa: The Role of the EU*, 16 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 1, 107–22 (2011).

Union and the emergence of the African security regime, which takes us to the next section of this article.

3 EXPLAINING THE APF

The launch of the African Union in July 2002, replacing the Organization for African Unity (OAU), represented a turning point in African (and international) security. In particular, the new African Peace and Security Architecture set the transition from the principle of ‘non-interference’, which had prevented the OAU from intervening even in instances of mass atrocities, to the principle of ‘non-indifference’, which allows the AU to get involved in situations of ‘war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity’. Thus, the AU has been involved in several peace operations – but has also failed to intervene in other cases. The key actors in the APSA are the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, who can benefit from the advice of the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. International actors reacted very positively to the birth of the APSA, but some of the pledged support has failed to materialize and the rest has been characterized by poor levels of coordination. In general, the APSA has suffered from various constraints at different levels. First, the overall commitment of most African countries has been weak, and some have even failed to pay their dues. Second, the application of principle of subsidiarity means that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are integral to the overall security architecture of the AU, though this relationship has proved problematic. Third, the AU has suffered from the lack of adequate capacity to deal with the ever-growing requirements of African security – with some of its institutions and mechanisms only partially being operationalized and implemented.²⁵ The European Union with its APF, to which we now turn, is one of the largest contributors and in less than ten years it has committed (and for the most part delivered speedily) more than EUR 1 billion.

3.1 THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE LAUNCH

The establishment of the APF has its origin in some informal discussions between officials of the AU Commission and the European Commission in July 2002 when

²⁵ S. Klingebiel, *Regional Security in Africa and the Role of External Support*, 17 *European J. Dev. Research* 13, 437–48 (2005); P. Williams, *From Non-Intervention to Non-indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture*, 106 *African Affairs* 423, 253–79 (2007); B. Franke & R. Esmenjaud, *Who owns African ownership? The Africanisation of African security and its limits*, 15 *South African J. Int'l Affairs* 2, 137–58 (2008); B. Franke & S. Gänzle, *How “African” is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of regional Security Cooperation in Africa*, 5 *African Sec.* 1, 88–104 (2012).

the AU was established. Peace and security was considered ‘a natural area’ in which to collaborate,²⁶ also because the European Union had already financially assisted peace operations in Burundi (led by the AU) and in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia (led by ECOWAS).²⁷ This plan became concrete in July 2003 in Maputo, when the AU Assembly formally proposed to the EU the set up of a facility to support Africa-led peace operations.²⁸ Poul Nielson, the then EU Commissioner for Development has claimed that he had already introduced his ‘vision for a peace facility’ at the EU-ACP Ministerial meeting in June 2013, when he was seeking ‘something which would strengthen African ownership’ and something that would solve ‘the problem of relying on ad hoc solutions for supporting peacekeeping operations in Africa’.²⁹ Conversely, many observers have argued that the EU simply responded to the request of the African Union, and in this sense ‘the establishment of the APF owes much more to the entrepreneurship of the AU’s Commissioner Said Djinnit than anybody else’.³⁰ Interestingly, at the Maputo summit, the appeal of the AU Assembly was not to generate new resources, but to create a common pool from existing but unspent funds.

In spite of the endorsement granted from both within the AU Commission and the European Commission, a number of obstacles had to be surmounted before a full proposal could be unveiled. First, the idea of drawing on the European Development Fund (EDF) – since no other funds were available in the EU budget – not only posed the problem of a potential securitization of the relations between the EU and the ACP Group, but also cast doubts upon the ‘DAC-ability’ of EDF resources, especially for those Member States (i.e., Germany) that were lagging behind in meeting the aid targets set for 2006.³¹ Second, using

²⁶ Interview with an official from the EEAS, February 2013.

²⁷ The missions in Liberia (EUR 8 million to ECOWAS), Burundi (EUR 25 million to the AU) and Ivory Coast (EUR 12.5 million to ECOWAS) were all funded with EDF money, from the B-envelope of the countries’ national indicative programmes (NIPs).

²⁸ Assembly of the African Union, Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Dec.21 II, *Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union*, Maputo, (10–12 Jul. 2003).

²⁹ P. Nielson, *EU Aid: What Works and Why*, UNU-Wider Working Paper 76 (2012). A similar view came out from one of his interviews published just after the Maputo summit in *The Courier ACP-EU*, the official journal of the EU-ACP partnership. D. Morrissey, *The EU-Africa dialogue is here to stay: Support in Maputo for a Peace Support Operation Facility*, *The Courier ACP-EU*, 6 (July–August 2003). Nielson’s activism was shared by Chris Patten, the then Commissioner for External Relations, who argued that the APF was ‘an expression of African solidarity, and Africans taking responsibility for what is going on in their own continent, that Africans decided to contribute part of what are already their resources under EDF to the creation of peace. I am firmly convinced that they are right’, in European Report, *EU/Africa: Consensus on Enhancing Dialogue on Peace and Development*, 508 (19 Nov. 2003).

³⁰ Interview with an official from the AU Commission, March 2013.

³¹ *Council will allow creation of support facility for African peace-keeping forced financed by EDF*, Agence Europe, 14 November 2003. In the context of the Financing for Development conference held in Monterrey in March 2002, the EU Member States agreed to jointly increase their collective volume of aid from 0.33 to 0.39 as a percentage of their collective Gross National Income (GNI). This increase may seem

the words of Commissioner Nielson, ‘the creation of the Peace Facility necessitated a veritable slalom between the pillars of the Maastricht Treaty defining the different sectors of EU cooperation’.³² Security policy fell under the competence of the Council, but the utilization of the EDF implied an extension of the European Commission’s competence from conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction into conflict management. Any of the proposed solutions was seen to be upsetting the delicate balance of power between the two key EU institutions: within the European Commission, officials were afraid that the Council would start interfering with EU development policy; within the Council, policy-makers were apprehensive about the fact that the European Commission would seek further involvement in EU security policy.³³ Third, non-African countries of the ACP Group lamented the lack of similar attention to other types of external shocks – most notably environmental disasters – faced by various countries in the Pacific and in the Caribbean regions.³⁴

These and other doubts became the object of intensive negotiations in the context of the EU General Affairs Council and of the ACP Council of Ministers, both held in November 2003. Within the EU, the most serious divisions concerned the issue of funding. Several Member States (i.e., Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark) had reservations about the diversion of development funds from their original destination. Similar concerns were raised by most, but not all, NGOs: in fact, those involved in peace building did not seem unhappy about the EU’s increased emphasis on conflict management.³⁵ Another contentious issue was the choice of beneficiaries. Some (most notably the UK) wanted the APF to focus on building the capacity of the AU – attaching significant importance to closer collaboration on the ground with the UN. Others (most notably France), questioning the AU’s legitimacy to speak on behalf of the entire continent, preferred to engage with the RECs, which had a more established tradition in the promotion of peace.³⁶ The final major division saw some Member States (with France in the forefront) who on the one hand, wanted to preserve the prominent role of the Council in security policy, whilst on the other hand, the

modest, but for some countries (i.e., Germany, Italy) it required major efforts. Moreover, in May 2005 the EU Member States committed themselves to a more ambitious goal, that of reaching 0.56% by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. See M. Carbone, *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid* (Routledge 2007).

³² Nielson, *supra* n. 29, at 13.

³³ Sicurelli, *supra* n. 1.

³⁴ Interview with two officials from the ACP Secretariat, February 2013.

³⁵ Interview with two officials from the EEAS, February 2013, and one from the European Commission, January 2013. See also *Council will allow creation of support facility for African peace-keeping forces financed by EDF*, *supra* n. 31; D. Cronin, *EU to agree on using aid funds for peacekeeping*, *European Voice*, 6 Apr. 2006.

³⁶ Bagoyoko & Gibert, *supra* n. 1; T. Chafer, *The AU: a new arena for Anglo-French cooperation in Africa?*, 49 *J. Modern African Stud.* 1, 55–82 (2011).

European Commission proposed an ‘extensive application’ of Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement and therefore claimed a significant role for itself in the management of the APF.³⁷ Eventually, a compromise on all these issues was found.³⁸ First, it was stipulated that the APF would provisionally be financed by the EDF, but only for the time necessary to find alternative funding sources – also on the basis of an evaluation conducted after a year’s trial. Second, funds could be accessed by the AU as well as by the RECs, provided that the AU had previously approved their request. Third, the enhanced role of the European Commission would be complemented by closer involvement of the Council in the scrutiny and approval of any peace support operation. Meanwhile, the Pacific and Caribbean countries had received reassurances that additional money would be allocated to address their environmental problems, and therefore the ACP Council of Ministers also gave the green light.³⁹ The APF was formally approved by the Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers on 11 December 2003, and became fully operational in March 2004.⁴⁰

The few existing academic analyses have concluded that the establishment of the APF was driven mainly by the pursuit of (different types of) material interests. For some, the European Commission used the APF to ‘steal’ competences away from the Council: by framing security in Africa as a development issue, it sought to extend its sphere of action to new policy areas.⁴¹ For others, the APF was agreed upon only because the interests of most Member States (most notably France and the UK), who wanted to avoid the risk (in terms of casualties and potential political damage) of sending troops to Africa, were not so pronounced.⁴² Yet others argue that, whilst being the result of a decade-long discussion between European and African actors on the importance of conflict prevention and conflict management for development in Africa, the APF still represented a way to buttress the EU’s ambition to have a more coherent and ambitious foreign policy (towards Africa).⁴³

³⁷ Interview with an official from the EEAS, February 2013 and two from the European Commission, January–February 2013. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement states the following: ‘In situations of violent conflict the Parties shall take all suitable action to prevent an intensification of violence, to limit its territorial spread, and to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the existing disputes’.

³⁸ *Council approves financial facility for Peace*, Agence Europe, 19 Nov. 2003.

³⁹ Interview with two officials from the ACP Group, February 2013, and one from the European Commission, January 2013.

⁴⁰ European Union, *Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa*, OJ L 345/108, (31 Dec. 2013).

⁴¹ Sicurelli, *supra* n. 1. See also Bagoyoko & Gibert, *supra* n. 1.

⁴² Keane, *supra* n. 1; Olsen, *supra* n. 1; Chafer, *supra* n. 36.

⁴³ G.R. Olsen, *Coherence, consistency and political will in foreign policy: The European Union’s Policy towards Africa*, 9 Perspectives European Politics & Socy. 2, 157–71 (2008).

While these studies offer valid explanations, they overlook the more normative aspects of the APF. First, in line with the promotion of the *development-security nexus*, since conflicts and instability retard development, aid for peace and security was deemed a legitimate way of using development resources by both parties. In a document co-signed by both Nielson and Djinnit, it was maintained that ‘there should be no trade-off between development aid on the one hand and peace-support measures on the other. The decision to extend the use of development funds to peace and security issues was therefore a deliberate one’.⁴⁴ Second, in recognition of the principle of *solidarity* that peace and security would be beneficial to the whole continent, all African countries decided to contribute to the APF with a share (1.5%) of the resources in their National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) – in addition to the unspent funds originating from the general EDF pot. The introduction of this ‘slicing mechanism’ followed the recommendations made by the AU itself in Maputo in July 2003.⁴⁵ Third, in compliance with the principle of *ownership*, it was established that only Africa-led operations, consistent with UN principles and objectives, would be funded. The EU, thus, endorsed the view that Africans are best suited to finding the best solution to their problems. This was the first time that an actor in the North had delegated significant amounts of resources to an actor in the South in the area of peace and security. Since then, several other international actors have followed suit – though they have not always maintained their promises.

The initial allocation from the 9th EDF (2002–2007) was EUR 250 million, but it soon became clear that, since a large portion of this amount was immediately spent on the AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS), additional funds would be required. Moreover, the first official evaluation conducted just a year after its establishment, concluded that the APF represented ‘an example of the EU providing constructive support rapidly to African organizations’, ‘the right form of external support, at the right moment’.⁴⁶ The APF was thus replenished four times under the 9th EDF reaching a total of EUR 440 million by 2007.⁴⁷ The new allocation of EUR 300 million under the Intra-Indicative Programme of the 10th

⁴⁴ European Commission, *Securing Peace and Stability for Africa: The EU-Funded African Peace Facility*, 4 (Brussels: European Commission, 2004).

⁴⁵ In that context it was established that: ‘such a Facility should be based on the principle of solidarity among African countries and should be financed from resources allocated to each of them under the existing cooperation agreements with the EU, initially supplemented by an equivalent amount of unallocated European Development Fund (EDF) resources’. See Assembly of the African Union, *supra* n. 28.

⁴⁶ J. Mackie, A. Bah, J. Frederiksen & S. Sabiiti, *Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility* (ECORYS 2006).

⁴⁷ There was some tension between the European Commission and the Council when the APF envelope under the 9th EDF was supplemented with EUR 7.7 million from the EU’s budget for the African Peace Facility. The legal opinion of the Council was that the European Commission did not have the power to use ‘budget appropriations for development cooperation’ to fund ‘peace-support

EDF (2008–2013) was again not sufficient, and in 2010 an additional EUR 300 million was made available, followed by approximately another EUR 100 million in late 2012 (see Table 1).⁴⁸ These replenishments reiterated the usual doubts from the usual suspects over the securitization of EU development policy and of the need to find a permanent solution for what had originally been presented as a temporary solution. At the same time, it was pointed out how the integration of the APF within the EU budget risked jeopardizing some of the more normative aspects of the initiative, most notably the upholding of the principle of ownership.⁴⁹ In the words of a Commission official, ‘True, on several occasions the Council has said that we would need to find a permanent solution, but I am not really sure anybody really wants to change the status quo. I think we are stuck with what we decided in 2003.’⁵⁰ Within the AU, the official line was that the APF represented an ideal way to operationalize the security-development nexus. The statement made by an AU Commission official is emblematic: ‘If you don’t have peace, you really can’t have development. Money that is going to peace and security, to ensuring stability in countries, is also facilitating development.’⁵¹ In reality, many policy-makers within the AU feared that with a change in the status quo they would lose a crucial source not only for funding peace operations but also for enhancing the AU’s visibility.⁵²

Table 1 *APF Financial Overview under the 9th EDF and 10th EDF*
(in Million EUR)

	9th EDF		10th EDF	
	Commitments	Payments	Commitments	Payments
2004	250	80.5		
2005		68.4		
2006	50	75.3		

objectives’. On the other hand, the European Commission argued that the EUR 7.7 million had been requested by South Africa. D. Cronin, *Legal spat over Africa aid funds*, European Voice (2 Feb. 2006).

⁴⁸ European Commission, *Annual Report. The African Peace Facility 2009* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2010); European Commission, *Annual Report. The African Peace Facility 2010* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2010); European Commission, *Annual Report. The African Peace Facility 2011* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2012); European Commission, *Annual Report. The African Peace Facility 2012* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2013).

⁴⁹ J. Crosbie, *Row over funding of security in Africa*, European Voice (8 Mar. 2007). Interview with an official from the ACP Secretariat, February 2013, two from the European Commission, January–February 2013, and two from the EEAS, February 2013.

⁵⁰ Interview with an official from the European Commission, February 2013.

⁵¹ D. Cronin, *EU to agree on using aid funds for peacekeeping*, European Voice (6 Apr. 2006).

⁵² Interview with two officials from the AU Commission, March 2013.

	<i>9th EDF</i>		<i>10th EDF</i>	
	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>
2007	45 37.2 2 55	77.7		
2008		10.4	300.6	
2009		30.4		33.6
2010		3.8	300	78.5
2011		2.55		132
2012				171.8
Total	439.2	349.05	600.6	421.3

Source: European Commission, *Annual Report. The APF 2012* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2013).

*Table 2 APF Individual Commitments under the 9th EDF and 10th EDF
(in Million EUR)*

	<i>Peace Support Operations</i>	<i>Capacity Building</i>	<i>Early Response Mechanism</i>
2004	80	6	
2005	78	0	
2006	93	1	
2007	97	20	
2008	53	0	15
2009	61	0	
2010	62	10	
2011	135	12	
2012	167.3	43	

Source: European Commission, *Annual Report. The APF 2012* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2013).

3.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION

The APF is centred on the twin objective of supporting Africa-led peace operations and of building African capacity in the area of security. The largest share

of APF resources, however, has been devoted to the running of peace missions (see Table 2), most notably the ones in Sudan (AMIS) and in Somalia (AMISOM), which have not been particularly successful. In the case of AMIS, the EU failed to understand that the mission's growing requirements would have stretched the capabilities of the nascent AU (which was still unprepared to deal with complex conflicts) and failed also to coordinate effectively with other actors such as the UN and NATO (which ultimately led not only to a waste of resources but also to increased transaction costs for the AU itself). Ultimately, the EU did not manage to change the course of events and, in spite of its large financial contribution, most of the changes it recommended were not implemented. As for AMISOM, the support provided through the APF became part of the EU's new emphasis on a comprehensive approach to security and development – and complementary funds came from the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and from several Member States (most notably, Italy, UK, Sweden). Despite some degrees of improvement in terms of coherence, also in this case the EU's impact was limited, because of the complications of the conflict itself, and also because of the constraints imposed by EDF funding.⁵³ In fact, the list of non-eligible APF expenditures includes ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries for soldiers and military training for soldiers. In this sense, more than 'the discrepancy between its pro-Africanization rhetoric . . . and its reluctance to commit sufficient resources to AU-led missions'⁵⁴, the two missions seem to 'demonstrate that the EU needs to loosen its restrictive conditions on the funding it provides to AU operations or find alternative ways of providing the adequate equipment needed'.⁵⁵

In contrast, the other two AU missions supported by the EU, one in the Comoros (AMISEC) and the other in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), can be considered 'APF success stories: they were short and effective'.⁵⁶ The AU mission in the Central African Republic, which comprised of soldiers from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), has contributed to durable peace and security by creating the preconditions for sustainable development in the country. The APF funds, in particular, targeted the process of demobilization of ex-combatants. In the case of AU's mission in the Comoros, aimed at stabilizing the country during the elections in 2006 and in 2008, the

⁵³ B. Franke, *The European Union supporting actions to the African Union missions in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM)*, in *European Security and Defense Policy: the First 10 Years (1999-2009)* at 255–64 (G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane eds., European Union Inst. Sec. Stud. 2009); A. Vines, *Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa*, 86 *Int'l Affairs* 5, 1091–1108 (2010).

⁵⁴ Franke, *supra* n. 53, at 259.

⁵⁵ Vines, *supra* n. 53, at 1100.

⁵⁶ R. Poulton, E. Trillo & L. Kukuk, *Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation*, Report prepared by IBP Int'l Consulting European Union 13.

EU's resources served to support the Tanzanian and Sudanese contingents of the mission tasked with monitoring elections in Anjouan.⁵⁷ The success of these two small-scale missions seem to confirm what appeared to be a rather surprising statement made by Javier Solana before the UK House of Lords in 2006: 'The beauty of the thing is that it has been successful. We have never done something, which has been as successful as this. Maybe it would not have been successful if we had had a lot of money!'⁵⁸

The second pillar of the APF is capacity building, which is even more important in demonstrating the EU's real commitment to nurturing African ownership. This aspect was strengthened when the APF was integrated into the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy and made a key component of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security.⁵⁹ By doing so, the EU's central aim was that of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the AU and the RECs, especially on the planning and conduct of peace-support operations. The EU, thus, has played an important role in helping the AU finalize crucial components of the APSA such as the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System.⁶⁰ However, the EU's decision to focus on the training of soldiers – and in this sense we should interpret the Europeanization of the former French peacekeeping training programme RECAMP (*Reinforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix*) – has proved highly controversial, not least because African soldiers have more experience on the ground than their European trainers. In the words of an official of the AU Commission, 'there is no shortage of well-trained African troops, as also shown by the fact that Africans are well represented in many UN missions around the world. Maybe this was an answer to EU needs, rather than African needs'.⁶¹ Along similar lines, Franke has noted that probably 'such training is easy-to-sell to domestic constituencies because of the perceived harmlessness'.⁶²

Another change that followed from the incorporation of the APF into the JAES was the fact that, in line with the EU's emphasis on the comprehensive approach to security, the APF's remit was broadened to include conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization. In particular, an Early Response Mechanism (ERM)

⁵⁷ European Commission, *Annual Report 2009*, *supra* n. 48; European Commission, *Annual Report 2010*, *supra* n. 48.

⁵⁸ J. Solana, *Examination of Witness (Questions 160-164)*, 14 Mar. 2006, in *The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership*, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 34th Report.

⁵⁹ A statement at the second Africa-EU Summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 confirmed the commitment of both parties: 'The APF has made a substantial contribution and is a good example of how partner support can complement and reinforce African funding for African-led peace support operations'.

⁶⁰ B. Franke, *EU-AU Cooperation in Capacity Building*, 62 *Studia Diplomatica* 3, 69–74 (2009); N. Pirozzi, *Towards an Effective Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?* 45 *Int'l Spectator* 2, 85–101 (2010).

⁶¹ Interview with two officials from the AU Commission, March 2013.

⁶² Franke, *supra* n. 60, at 72.

was introduced to cover fact-finding missions and mediation actions.⁶³ The problem, however, is that these have been ‘one-off missions and while the individual mediation missions may be a success, the process is not built into APSA and does not necessarily increase AU and REC institutional capacity for mediation’.⁶⁴ Moreover, the decision to support a programme for an AU Liaison Office in post-conflict countries was meant to give representation to the AU on the ground and, more importantly, to monitor fragile situations and support post-conflict reconstruction and peace building activities.⁶⁵ At the same time, resources were also made available to strengthen the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission. The overall logic behind these initiatives was that of increasing the legitimacy of the AU in Africa:

one of the main problems faced by the African Union is that priorities have not really been identified and articulated at the political level. Many African countries have been wary of the implications of the development of the African Union and more specifically the APSA.⁶⁶

In light of all these changes, a second official evaluation was conducted in 2011 and its conclusion, somewhat overenthusiastically, was that ‘in a remarkably short period, the APF has changed the face of peace and security in Africa’.⁶⁷ While these remarks may be exaggerated, the APF has undoubtedly contributed to boosting the AU’s clout in the field of peace and security and as an actor in the international arena. Moreover, by providing support to the existing RECs, the EU has not only attempted to implement its commitment to regionalism – contrary to what happens in trade policy, where the EU has ‘constructed’ regions and has undermined existing efforts of regional integration – but has also facilitated the improved relationship between the AU and the RECs. In the words of an official within the AU Commission, ‘in order to receive funds from the EU, the request made by the RECs must be endorsed by the AU; but in actual fact the reality is, and this would have been unbelievable only a few years ago, that the RECs now ask the AU to speak on their behalf in their relations with the EU’.⁶⁸ Conversely, despite being funded from the EDF, the interaction between the (Commission of

⁶³ For instance, in 2010 the AU and the RECs requested funding for six initiatives, which were accepted by the EU. These operations were: mediation operation in Madagascar; mediation and transition in Guinea; AU High Level Implementation Plan on Sudan; Office of the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia peace and national reconciliation; return to constitutional order in Niger; preparation of a peace consolidation and post-conflict reconstruction mission to Guinea-Bissau. European Commission, *Annual Report. The African Peace Facility 2011* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2011).

⁶⁴ Poulton et al., *supra* n. 56, at 15.

⁶⁵ This was considered a good instrument by the African side. See Addis Ababa, *Sixth meeting of the African Peace Facility Joint Coordination Committee*, Joint Communiqué (3 Feb. 2010).

⁶⁶ Interview with an official from the AU Commission, March 2013.

⁶⁷ Poulton et al., *supra* n. 56, at 9.

⁶⁸ Interview with an official from the AU Commission, March 2013.

the) AU and (Secretariat of) the ACP Group has been practically non-existent.⁶⁹ It is therefore not surprising that the 'slicing mechanism', used under the 9th EDF as a concrete sign of solidarity between all African countries, was not renewed under the 10th EDF.

But the implementation of the APF has resulted in various unintended consequences. For instance, the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security has monopolized the attention of EU policy-makers, to the detriment of other areas of the JAES. In fact, the initial implementation of the first JAES Action Plan produced only cumbersome institutional frameworks meant to consolidate dialogue between the two parties, with a large number of meetings and technical activities often seen as the only indication of success.⁷⁰ The support to the APSA has even resulted in a sort of EU disengagement from African security: thus, 'True, some of the AU's missions would not have been possible without the EU's financial support. But I think that the EU has more or less contracted out its security policy to the AU and the African RECs'.⁷¹ More critically, the EU's emphasis on the APF and the APSA has generated a serious paradox: on the one hand, the EU has committed itself to strengthening the AU; on the other hand, it has risked undermining its legitimacy in Africa. In the words of an official of the AU Commission:

The APSA, as well as the AU, is relatively young and many institutions and mechanisms have been set up too quickly. This has generated a gap between the AU's institutional structure and the support for these institutions at the level of the African member countries. The problem is not necessarily with inadequate EU funding. The AU needs to get its support from within. If its members were more involved, they would press harder on issues.⁷²

These views go together with a more general criticism of the concepts of Africanization of security and African ownership. In fact, considering the level of support that the EU gives to the APSA and the AU's lack of institutional capacity, it has been observed that 'there is the real danger that it is the EU that decides when, where and how 'African solutions to African problems' are applied'.⁷³ In this sense, it could be argued that using African armies for externally funded (and externally driven) missions only serves to perpetuate the existing asymmetry in North-South relations, rather than bridging it.

⁶⁹ See Addis Ababa, *Third meeting of the African Peace Facility Joint Coordination Committee*, Joint Communiqué (29 Sep. 2006).

⁷⁰ Carbone, *supra* n. 16.

⁷¹ Interview with an official from the EEAS, February 2013.

⁷² Interview with an official from the AU Commission, March 2013.

⁷³ Chafer, *supra* n. 36, at 70.

4 CONCLUSION

This article has analysed the EU's (indirect) promotion of security in Africa through one of its key initiatives, the APF. While the few existing analyses have argued that the establishment of the APF serves to promote the interests of either the EU Member States or the European Commission, this article has highlighted its normative aspects, most notably the promotion of a virtuous link between development and security policies and the upholding of the principle of ownership. Undoubtedly, the APF represents one of the most predictable sources of funding for the African Peace and Security Architecture, thus contributing to strengthening the visibility of the AU in international politics, as well as the role of the RECs. In this sense, it should be noted that while originally the APF was conceived mainly to fund Africa-led peace operations, its integration into the JAES was meant to place a stronger emphasis on capacity building and on prevention and mediation activities. One of the conundrums in EU external relations concerns the security-development nexus. In the words of an official from the European Commission, 'the money spent on the APF represents one of the best ways to use development resources' and therefore 'we should not ask whether development policy has been securitized, but actually if security policy has not been developmentalized'.⁷⁴ At the same time, only three years after having fully endorsed it, in light of the failure of the EU to find additional sources to fund the APF, AU Commissioner Djinnit stated that 'the commitment to European funding initially earmarked for development to finance peacekeeping operations raises ethical and moral problems'.⁷⁵

In fact, the implementation record of the APF and the EU's overall support to the APSA are far from ideal. The allocation of resources suggests that the APF has been mostly a conflict management tool – partly endorsing the views of those who had cautioned against the securitization of development policy. Moreover, the process to fund a peace mission challenges the same concept of ownership. Even though the EU has the final say it also requires an endorsement by the UN. Therefore in practice this means that Africa-led missions must be authorized by two external actors before they can actually begin. Moreover, there have been inadequate levels of coherence between the APF and other EU development and security instruments – not to mention the fact that several EU Member States (i.e., France, Germany, Italy and the UK) have established peace and security funds to directly support the APSA. These deficiencies are even more serious because the EU's involvement in African security in the near future risks being on the rise and additional resources would be needed – in fact, at the beginning of 2013 the EU

⁷⁴ Interview with an official from the European Commission, January 2013.

⁷⁵ Cited in Sicurelli, *supra* n. 21, at 188.

committed around EUR 76 billion to ECOWAS for an Africa-led peace mission in Mali (AFISMA).⁷⁶ On the one hand, further reliance on the EDF means that additional funds would be subtracted from projects more directly related to poverty eradication. On the other hand, military interventions under the EU general budget would not sit together with the principles of partnership and ownership that underpin the APF.⁷⁷ Moreover, while the APSA has received significant attention and funding, other components of the JAES have been overlooked. Clearly, the case of the APF demonstrates that development and security are inextricably linked and that, potentially, there is a mutually reinforcing link between the two. The central matters, however, remain the effective use of resources (even more so than their origin) and the genuine promotion of African ownership.

⁷⁶ European Commission, *supra* n. 48.

⁷⁷ M. Furness, *Sustaining EU Financing for Security and Development: The Difficult Case of the African Peace Facility*, German Development Institute Briefing Paper 7 (2011).